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Over the last decade outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) flows and stocks from the 
emerging economies expanded dramatically. This aggregate trend is reflective of the fact that 
at the firm level technological capabilities and market share of many TNCs from the 
emerging economies (ETNCs) have become progressively stronger. Samsung for example has 
become market leader in the production of the Dynamic Random Access Memories (DRAMs) 
and Mittal the leading manufacturer of steel.1  
 
The significant increase of FDI from the emerging economies has given cause to revisit 
existing theoretical as well as policy constructs. Firstly, most theories of foreign direct 
investment explain flows of capital between developed economies, or from developed to 
developing economies. The acquisition of firms in developed countries by firms that originate 
from developing economies has added a new dimension to the understanding of OFDI flows. 
In addition, experience from foreign investment projects has contributed significantly to the 
development of emerging economies’ TNC’s revenues, technological capabilities and global 
market shares (see Monkiewicz, 1986; Hobday, 1997; Mirza, 2000; Sachwald, 2001; 
Mathews, 2002; UNCTAD, 2005). 
 
The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, relying on the received literature and empirical 
evidence we suggest that for analytical purposes the outflow of FDI from emerging 
economies can meaningfully be divided into three distinct ‘waves’. We discuss a set of 
strategic drivers of OFDI and identify their shifting relative importance throughout the period 
of these three waves. Second, we discuss how policy regimes towards FDI have shifted over 
the course of the three waves with special emphasis on contemporary home government 
measures for facilitating OFDI.  
 
This paper thus examines emerging economy FDI drivers and home government policies that 
are complementary towards supporting the activities of ETNCs. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows: In section two we divide the historical FDI outflows from emerging 
economies into three analytical ‘waves’. Section three examines the drivers of OFDI. Section 
four analyzes the policy implications for home countries. Section five concludes. 
 
                                                 







Albeit the numbers still favor heavily the developed economies, FDI from the 
emerging economies (OFDI) have become increasingly important from the 1990s. 
OFDI rose from US$335billion in 1995 to US$1.4trillion in 2005 (UNCTAD, 2006, 
pp 103-104). The number of emerging economies with OFDI stocks exceeding 
US$5billion increased from 6 in 1990 to 27 in 2005. Seven firms from the emerging 
economies were among the top 100 transnational corporations ranked by ownership of 
foreign asset stocks in 2006. The increase in OFDI has been driven by a variety of 
factors such as increasing wealth, reforms in trade and investment policies, regional 
integration, loosening capital controls, progressing industrialization, and build-up of 
firm-specific advantages of capabilities. 
 
Our agenda here is not to review contemporary empirical trends of foreign direct 
investment from emerging economies. Such reviews are available elsewhere, e.g. 
UNCTAD (2006) and Gammeltoft (2008). Rather, our agenda is to probe beneath the 
quantitative surface to bring out a number of important qualitative changes in the 
composition and structural characteristics of outward investment from emerging 
economies. By comparing the older and the newer literature on OFDI and taking a 
longer historical perspective we suggest that for analytical purposes investment 
outflows from emerging economies can meaningfully be divided into three broad 
‘waves’: the first from the 1960s to the mid 1980s, the second into the 1990s, and the 
third from the 1990s until the onset of the current global financial slowdown. 
 
Previously, up into the 1980s, emerging economy firms mainly invested abroad to 
establish trade supporting networks and to access markets. Access to natural resources 
abroad and escape from bureaucratic restrictions at home were other prominent 
motives. Investments were mainly in other developing countries, especially those with 
short psychic distance (geographic, cultural, ethnic, institutional). ETNCs typically 
entered with minority ownership and engaged in greenfield investments and in many 
countries the companies most active in outward investment were state owned. When 
investing in developed economies they were mainly active in ‘sunset’ industries with 
less fierce competition from developed country counterparts. 
 
From the 1990s onwards there were various shifts in the investment motives, modes 
of ownership, sectoral composition and typical destinations of OFDI: ETNCs were 
more frequently privately owned, even though a high degree of state ownership 
remains among the largest ETNCs, especially in natural resources. They more 
frequently took on majority ownership in outward investment projects and even 
though greenfield investments remain the dominant entry mode, international 
acquisitions became more frequent. Services became the dominant sector in OFDI 
(e.g., finance and business services) over manufacturing and natural resources. Even 
though the developing world remains the main destination of OFDI, investments 
became increasingly oriented towards developed rather than developing country 
destinations: reflecting also the cumulative increase in monopolistic advantages of 
ETNCs they increasingly invested to acquire technology, brands, and marketing 
capabilities in advanced economies. While a small number of countries remain 
responsible for the bulk of OFDI, there has also been a diversification in terms of the 
number of emerging and developing economies engaging in outward investments on a 




regional and South-South investments are concerned and efficiency seeking is the 
second most important motive (UNCTAD, 2006) but asset-seeking investments into 
developed economies became gradually important for the purpose of accessing 
technology, R&D and marketing capabilities, brands, distribution networks, and 
managerial and organizational competencies. 
 
More generally, trends in outward investment from emerging and developing 
economies can be divided the aforementioned three broad ‘waves’. Any such 
abstraction and division of time periods into discrete waves must necessarily be rather 
crude given the huge national, industry and firm-level diversity in investment projects 
and flows. There are also many well-known limitations and inaccuracies associated 
with official FDI statistics: misclassification of capital flight and portfolio flows, 
misclassification of indirect outward investment by foreign affiliates, and other 
reporting and registration problems abound, and the problems are especially severe in 
developing-country statistics.  
 
Nevertheless there seems to be sufficient justification to propose a third wave of 
OFDI as outlined in Table 1 – a wave qualitatively different from the two previous 
waves depicted in the received literature.  
 
The received literature suggests that there have been two different waves of outward 
FDI from developing countries (Dunning et al., 1996, 1998; UNCTAD, 2005c): from 
the 1960s until early 1980s, and thereafter. The first-wave firms were driven mainly 
by market- and efficiency-seeking factors and investments were mainly directed 
towards other developing countries, most often neighboring countries. In the second 
wave, driven by a combination of pull and push factors, strategic-asset seeking also 
became a motive and investments into developed countries and developing countries 
outside the investor’s own region became more important. The first wave of FDI 
originated predominantly from Latin America where new TNCs emerged from 
Argentina, Mexico and Chile, followed by Brazilian, Colombian and Venezuelan 
competitors (Andreff, 2003). During a period, which otherwise emphasized 
industrialization strategies based on import substitution, Latin American TNCs 
internationalized on the basis of products that had met the needs of their growing 
domestic markets and outward FDI went primarily to neighboring developing 
countries with similar demand structures.  
 
The second wave from the 1980s was dominated by Asian TNCs, spreading from  
Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and thereafter Malaysia, Thailand, 
China, India and the Philippines, and accompanied Asian countries’ export oriented 
industrialization strategies. Outward FDI from Latin America was less prominent 
during this period. Asian TNCs expanded mostly in the fast growing foreign markets 
of other NIEs but they also outward invested to access cheap labor in developing 
countries that were less developed than their home countries. 
 
In the 1990s a third wave of OFDI emerges. At this stage the largest Asian TNCs 
already competed with Western TNCs, invested into developed countries, and some 
countries were becoming net FDI exporters (South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan), a 
position traditionally reserved for developed countries (Andreff, 2003). The new 





The three waves are summarized in Table 1. Each wave retains most of the features 
from the previous one but some features are added and others revised. It is also 
important to note that the waves are broad, ‘ideal typical’, and aggregate abstractions. 
At the present time, for example, any individual developing economy or any 






Table 1  Three waves of outward FDI 
 
 
First Second Third 





Especially Latin America Especially Asia More geographically 
diverse country origins 
Resurgence of Latin 
America 








Hong Kong, Korea, 
Colombia, Mexico, India 
Hong Kong, China, 
Taiwan, Singapore, 
South Korea, Brazil, 
Malaysia 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Singapore, Brazil, South 
Africa, China, Korea, 
Malaysia, Argentina, 
Russia, Chile, Mexico 
Destinations Mainly other developing 
countries in same region 
Mainly developing 
countries, but also to 





services mainly regional 
destinations 
Mature sectors 
increasingly also into 
developed economies 









Into developed: mature, 
cost-competitive 
industries (automotives, 
electronics, IT services), 
asset-augmenting 
investments 
As 2nd wave, but with 
more going into 
developed economies 
 Mainly horizontal Horizontal and vertical Horizontal and vertical 
Ownership 
advantages 
Home country specific Home country and firm 
specific 
Home country and firm 
specific 








business models, and 
management 
Same as 1st wave Now also: 





Vertical control over 
factor/product markets 
Motivation Resource and market 
seeking 
 
Into developing: resource 
and market seeking 
Into developed: market 
and asset seeking 
As 2nd wave, but increase 
in asset seeking 
 Asset exploitation Asset exploitation 
Minor asset augmentation
Also asset augmentation 
Market power enhancing 
(especially natural 
resource related) 
Policy regime Import substitution Export orientation Schumpeterian 
 FDI regulation FDI coordination and 
facilitation 
FDI promotion 
Source: Dunning et al. 1996, 1998, Lall 1983, Chudnovsky  and Lopez 2000, Andreff 2003, 






This section discusses the strategic drivers of OFDI from emerging economies and how the 
drivers have varied over the course of the three waves. It takes its point of departure in the 
motives framework advanced by Narula and Dunning (2000), Cantwell and Mudambi (2001), 
Gammeltoft (2006), and Rasiah (2001) but with further motives that have evolved to drive 
cross border investments. These strategic drivers are considered important for home 
governments to understand so as to be able to provide effective support for their businesses 
relocating operations abroad. 
 
(# natural resource, market, labor, value chain control, financial incentives, technology) 
 
3.1 Natural Resource Seeking 
The natural resource seeking motive of TNCs has remained important among TNCs from the 
emerging economies investing abroad. UNCTAD (2006, p. 161) reported that a third of the 30 
largest mergers and acquisitions (MAs) in the primary sector over the period 1995-2005 were 
in the crude petroleum and natural gas industry. Government involvement has been 
particularly strong in the pursuit of natural resources when involving strategic natural 
resources.  
 
Soaring prices since 2005 has driven the rapidly growing economies of China and India 
aggressively to seek supplies from Central Asia and Africa. China’s expansion into extracting 
petroleum and natural gas began to grow strongly from 1993 when it began to experience a 
net trade deficit.  Home governments from the emerging economies have been the prime 
movers of oil-based OFDI. The state owned TNCs of China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), Oil and Natural Gas 
Company (ONGC) from India and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) enjoy strong 
government support in exploring and producing petroleum and natural gas in other 
developing economies for export to their own economies.  
 
The Brazilian and Chilean state-owned companies of Petrobras and ENAP respectively have 
also invested in West Asia to seek oil and natural gas supplies. Between 2004 and mid 2007 
Brazilian owned Petrobras invested US$4.4 billion to mine coal, oil and natural gas in Nigeria,  
United States, Argentina and Portugal (FDC, 2007, p. 11). Malaysia’s Petronas has petroleum 
mining interests in Iran, Egypt, Vietnam, Philippines and Chad. South African TNCs seeking 
oil and natural gas tended to only operate in Africa. 
 
High rents from soaring oil and gas prices have even attracted TNCs into highly risky 
locations. For example, Malaysia’s Petronas invested strongly to explore and produce oil in 
Sudan and Chad – both countries are classified among the high risk countries by the United 
Nations (see Patey, 2006; ECOS, 2006; cited in UNCTAD, 2006, p. 161). Chinese Oil firms 
have invested strongly in oil and natural gas exploration and production in Angola and Sudan 
– both countries are endowed with poor infrastructure. Chinese firms have also won 
concessions to explore oil in the Mannar region in Sri Lanka.  
 
The most aggressive home government pursuers of oil and gas mining rights from the 
emerging economies – i.e. China and India – compete directly in some bids while 
collaborating in other bids. Chinese firms won the concessions to mine oil in the prized 
oilfields of Kazakhstan beating off competition from an Indian firm in 2007. The Chinese 
government, through its three national oil firms, has an explicit policy to expand its oil mining 
rights abroad. Among its strategies include adapting its approach to meet host-government 
conditions. Indeed, the Chinese state firms in Angola and Sudan have a policy to train local 




firms the Indian government announced plans in 2007 to strengthen their own approach to 
attract oil-producing countries to offer its state company favorable mining rights. 
 
Chinese and Indian oil firms have also collaborated to reduce cut-throat competition in the 
industry. For example ONGC Videsh of India and Sinopec of China jointly bought a 50 
percent stake in American owned Omimex de Columbia in 2006 (China Daily, 2006: 1), and 
China’s CNPC and India’s ONGC announced on December 20 2006 that they had won a joint 
bid to acquire 37 percent of Petro-Canada’s stake worth US$573million at the al-Furat oil and 
gas fields in Syria (Mathaba.Net, 2006, p. 1). 
 
In metals, Anglo Gold, Illova Sugar, Impala Platinum, Metroex, Randgold Resources and 
Sasol have acquired state-owned mining firms following privatization in Africa.  Brazilian 
owned Colompanhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) expanded from 2002 to mine and smelt iron 
ore and pellets in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Europe (ECLAC, 2006). CVRD also 
invested US$1.2 billion in Mozambique to mine minerals and metals in the same period. 
CVRD also acquired INCO from Canada in 2007 for US$16.7 billion (Sauvant, 2008: 3). 
Hindalco invested in Australia to smelt aluminium and copper for firms in India, China, Saudi 
Arabia and Taiwan (see UNCTAD, 2006, p. 162), and bought Novelis in the United States in 
2007 for US$6 billion (Sauvant, 2008, p. 3). 
 
3.2 Market Seeking 
By and large TNCs from the emerging economies still use the two approaches used by firms 
from developed economies seek market access, viz., direct production and sales or to access 
third markets through preferential trade access. Home governments have not only assisted 
firms from the emerging economies in their relocation process but also engaged in bilateral 
negotiations in reduce red tape. 
 
Firms such as Hyundai from Korea, Sime Darby from Malaysia and Castle Beer from South 
Africa have acquired existing firms or invested in new plants abroad to access markets abroad. 
Hyundai assembles and sells cars in North America, Europe, India, China, Thailand, 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Sime Darby – through the acquisition of palm oil processing plants 
from Unilever in Rotterdam by Golden Hope, and the setting up of such plants in India and 
China – sells processed palm oil in these countries. The Taiwan Semiconductor Corporation 
(TSMC) has sales outlets in New York. Castle Beer spread into many parts of Africa by 
acquiring previously state owned breweries to supply domestic and regional markets. 
Included in this category is the broader markets integrated within regional trading 
arrangements. For example the creation of regional trading arrangements such as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area (AFTA), the North 
Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU) has expanded further 
common markets. For example, automotive firms – irrespective of ownership –enjoy 
preferential access to export components and parts throughout the ASEAN Industrial 
Cooperation (AICO) scheme. 
 
Another set of firms where scale economies have not been important – e.g. software – has 
also witnessed a strong penetration of operations by emerging economy TNCs in both 
developed and developing economies. TCS, Wipro and Infosys have expanded into both the 
developed large market of United States as well as the smaller markets of Malaysia and 
Singapore. 
 
The conditions involving the relocation of retailers seeking market access require an 
understanding of host-country regulatory environment. It will help home governments to 
provide through their embassies such information. Because supermarkets are engaged in sales 




foreign ownership. In Malaysia Bumiputera equity requirements are stipulated as conditions 
for investing in sectors where domestic sales exceeding 20 percent of output (Chee, 1986; 
Jomo, 2003).  
 
In some cases relocation decisions are based on using particular sites to access third country 
markets. Although much of the generalized system of preferences (GSP) were removed 
following the formation of the World Trade Organization the introduction of ‘everything but 
arms’ clause by the European Union and the bilateral trading arrangement by the United 
States, Japan and Canada has offered privileged access to their markets from least developed 
countries. Hence, China has become the largest investor in garment manufacturing – 
specializing on cut, manufacture and trim (CMT) operations – in Cambodia, Lao, Lesotho, 
Madagascar with the actual target being exports to North American, Europe and Japan (see 
UNCTAD, 2007; Rasiah, 2006). There is also sizable investment into garment manufacturing 
from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and Mauritius into these countries to 
access the developed markets. 
 
In the latter mode of entry some home governments have played a crucial role to ensure that 
national firms provide benefits abroad through training and observance of labor standards: e.g. 
Malaysian, Taiwanese, Korean and Singaporean offer training to local employees in their 
garment firms (Rasiah, 2007). Such developments have been important to reduce local 
pressures and claims of exploitation by local pressure groups.  
 
3.3 Labor Seeking 
TNCs from Taiwan and Korea began a careful strategy with the assistance of their 
governments to relocate low value added labor-intensive manufacturing operations in other 
developing economies as rising production costs has encouraged upgrading into designing 
and other higher value added activities in their home sites. China and Southeast Asia have 
become important destinations, especially from Malaysia and Thailand in the 1980s to 
Vietnam, Indonesia and Philippines from the 1990s. 
 
Whereas in the United States the enactment of customs items 806.3 and 807.0 - that lowered 
the value added tax on labor-intensive exports - helped the decomposition and relocation of 
labor-intensive low value added items to low cost sites (see Scibberas, 1977; Rasiah, 1988) 
the withdrawal of the generalized system of preferences (GSP) and the floating of the New 
Taiwan Dollar, Won and the Singapore dollar following the Plaza Accord of 1985 applied the 
pressure for the relocation of low value added assembly and processing activities to 
neighboring economies. Low value added firms from Singapore, Taiwan and Korea continue 
to have manufacturing operations in Malaysia and Thailand, but the focus has shifted more to 
the low cost countries of China, the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia. ASE, Acer and 
Chunghwa Picture tubes from Taiwan, and Samsung and LG Electronics from Korea are 
some examples of firms that relocated operations to low wage sites in Southeast Asia and 
China to lower manufacturing costs.  
 
Although the Taiwan government only approved officially OFDI to China from 1991 labor-
intensive segments of manufacturing had already begun to be redeployed across from the 
Island to mainland China from the 1980s through Hong Kong (Rasiah and Lin, 2004).  
 
Smaller TNCs such as Eng Technology and Atlan from Malaysia relocated operations in 
China and Philippines, and Indonesia respectively following rising wages and the evaporation 
of labor supply in Penang (Rasiah, 2002). Indeed, in addition to growing demand abroad these 
firms reported in 2000 that much of their manufacturing had been relocated out of Malaysia 
owing to labor scarcity. Malaysia’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry facilitated 





Where security, customs and other legal issues have been an issue when involving the less 
developed economies home and host government coordination has been instrumental in 
clearing such obstacles. Typically host governments have opened export processing zones to 
provide these services more effectively so that OFDI can start production operations to utilize 
low wage workers. Korean, Taiwanese, Chinese, Malaysia and Singaporean OFDI to 
Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia and Bangladesh enjoy these benefits from relocating there 
(UNCTAD, 2003). 
 
3.4 Value Chain Control Seeking 
The dynamics of coordination and control has taken on new dimensions since large retailers 
started to coordinate and drive quality improvements involving the activities of their suppliers. 
Unlike owning production these malls simply impose conditions that require participants in 
their supplier chains to meet a continuous set of demands.  
 
Whereas value chains in horticulture commodities are increasingly driven by retailer TNCs 
from the developed economies, conglomerates have evolved from the emerging economies 
with a wide ranging structure. The increasing significance of supermarket chains on the 
production and distribution of vegetables was initially pointed out by Dolan and Humphrey 
(2000) and Rasiah (2004). Supermarkets have increasingly taken over control in the value 
chains involving bananas, melons, vegetables and milk products from producers such as Del 
Monte and Chiquita. In vegetables, small producers who have not been able to meet the 
stringent and frequent improvements in quality standards and delivery times have fallen out 
from these chains (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). In fruits, instead of having Del Monte and 
Chiquita the products are increasingly carrying the brand names of Tesco, Safeways, 
Sainsbury and Albert Heinz supermarkets. 
 
Supermarkets from the emerging economies such as Giant and Parkson have taken on such 
roles to control similar value chains from their sales outlets throughout Southeast Asia and 
China. These firms are increasingly adopting the pattern of taking control over the production 
and distribution of merchandise, including the brand names of these items. The actual 
production of the goods have either been outsourced but supermarkets now exercise control 
over the chains by defining the procedures, standards and other requirements that suppliers 
are increasingly required to provide. 
 
3.5 Financial Incentive Seeking 
The relocation pattern of OFDI of the emerging economies suggests that incentives remain 
important. However, there is also evidence to suggest that both host and home governments 
end up providing incentives more than what is necessary (Rasiah, 2005). Some of these 
problems have cropped up because of TNCs’ efforts to optimize profits from their bargaining 
relationships with governments. Doraisami and Rasiah (2003) showed evidence of TNC 
declaration of profits falling sharply once tax holidays expire. 
 
In the period 2003-2005 the tax havens of Cayman Islands (42.1%) and British Virgin Island 
(10.0%) accounted for the largest and 3rd largest OFDI from China (Morck, Yeung and Zhao, 
2007, p. 5). Hong Kong (27.9%) enjoyed the second highest redeployment in the same period. 
Morck, Yeing and Zhao (2007) note that a lot of such outflows were targeted at tax benefits 
from being classified as foreign direct investment. 
 
TNCs from some of the emerging economies also enjoyed tax exemptions from income 




of tax abatement on income earned abroad and from 1995 (apart from banking, insurance and 
sea and air transport businesses) to Malaysian firms investing abroad (Ragayah, 1999, p.  470).  
 
Where the target is fiscal incentives home governments should coordinate OFDI policies 
taking account of host-site incentives and where possible establish or strengthen investment 
and incentive coordination and profit repatriation treaties that are favorable. The governments 
of Singapore and Malaysia are actively engaged in such negotiations and coordination when 
involving OFDI to Cambodia, Lao, Vietnam and Myanmar. 
 
3.6 Technology Seeking 
Several TNCs from the emerging economies have established horizontal relationships to 
either share technology through mergers or acquire outright assets from the developed 
economies located in superior high tech infrastructure. Home governments have played 
important roles to assist their national firms to negotiate deals related to mergers and 
acquisitions purely driven by efforts to access technology. 
 
Samsung Electronics from Korea and TSMC from Taiwan invested into R&D plants in the 
United States to seek technological support from the R&D labs, and human capital from 
universities and firms. Samsung Electronics has also started the construction of a large wafer 
fabrication plant in India in 2007 to take advantage of its huge human capital endowments in 
engineering – the reasons are similar to IBM’s, Intel’s and Microsoft’s expansion into India. 
Indian software engineers have played an important role in Samsung’s decision to fabricate 
12-inch wafers in India. 
 
Interestingly technology-driven mergers and acquisitions (MAs) have been a major channel of 
OFDI from the emerging economies. Asia enjoyed the highest share of MAs among the 
emerging economies over the period 1987-2006. A significant share of such brownfield 
investment have involved the acquisition of high tech firms from the developed economies 
with the aim of accessing both the technological and marketing benefits – e.g. Chinese 
Lenovo’s purchase of IBM’s computer division. Lenovo acquired the personal computer 
division of IBM for US$1.75 billion in 2005  (see Sauvant,  2008, p. 3). 
 
Governance issues in developed markets have also driven a number of TNCs from the 
emerging economies to acquire existing corporations as well as seek patent registration 
abroad. Stringent regulations in certain industries – e.g. the United States Food and Drug 
Administration (USFDA) in pharmaceutical and food-based industries – has encouraged 
TNCs from emerging economies to file patents as well as acquire foreign TNCs already 
enjoying such rights in the developed economies. Indian, Chinese and Brazilian firms have 
been targeting American firms to access both intellectual property rights as well as markets. 
 
Indian TNCs have also been active in takeovers in Europe. For example, Lupin entered into 
an agreement with Belgium’s Artifex Finance to acquire a 51 percent majority stake in Dafra 
Pharma giving the Indian firm access to 25 African countries. Before being majority acquired 
itself by a Japanese company in 2008, Ranbaxy acquired Belgium’s Ethimed, Romania’s 
Terapia and GSK’s Italian unit in 2006. Dr Reddy’s bought out Germany’s Betapharm and 
Aurobindo Pharma acquired UK generics firm Milpharma in 2006. 
 
In some emerging economies government has encouraged firms to internationalize operations 
to acquire technological capabilities by giving them incentives. For example, the Malaysian 
government introduced incentives in 2003 to encourage firms to acquire foreign owned high 
tech firms from abroad (MASSA News, June 2005; cited in Ariff and Lopez, 2008, p. 21). 
Such government support through financial subsidies and incentives also included a MYR1 





The Indian, Brazilian, Malaysian, Korean, Chinese and Taiwan governments have actively 
encouraged their firms to seek technology from abroad, including through mergers and 
acquisitions. Home government policies have varied from simply approving such acquisitions 
to vetting, monitoring and ex-post appraisals to ensure that the technologies sought were 
appropriated. The latter is particularly undertaken using experts carrying tacit and experiential 
knowledge, especially when involving incubated or state-sponsored or subsidized firms. 
China’s Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM’s personal computer division and Malaysia’s Proton’s 
acquisition of British owned Lotus involved considerable assistance from home governments. 
 
Overall it can be seen that more synergies can be appropriated from OFDI when home 
governments understand the motives behind their relocations. Although macroeconomic 
conditions are still important the pursuit of certain resources  
4 Implications for Home Country Policies 
 
FDI requires capital and foreign exchange, on both of which developing and emerging 
economies are typically relatively scarce. Nevertheless many emerging economy 
governments today have devised policies to actively support the internationalization of 
domestic firms. In countries such as China and India not only central but also regional and 
local governments actively promote the internationalization of their firms. 
 
Once the macroeconomic conditions have been addressed to avert the debilitating effects of 
capital flight home government policies on FDI from the emerging economies can benefit 
enormously from an understanding of the drivers behind relocation. In the following we 
discuss the policy implications that can be drawn for home country policies from the ODFI 
patterns of emerging economies discussed in the previous sections.  
 
The policy position towards FDI has generally shifted from being more skeptical in the 1970s 
enforcing a range of conditionalities, which in turn influenced firm-level internationalization 
patterns and strategies, to a much more accommodating position from the 1990s onwards. 
These latter policies emphasized investment promotion and the provision of the best possible 
framework conditions for foreign investors, including infrastructure provision, fast track 
bureaucratic procedures, and different forms of subsidy and tax alleviation schemes.  
 
Today, the most effective set of government policies should take account of the reasons 
driving the internationalization of economic activities. Put simply home governments should 
know why their businesses are relocating operations abroad before they can actually frame 
policies to assist them. 
 
On the positive side home governments promote OFDI to seek new opportunities to expand 
profits and market shares for their firms. On the negative side home governments are often 
concerned with its potential impact on domestic jobs, supply of capital and balance of 
payments. The typical macroeconomic assessments that investment advisors provide should 
just be the first step in the screening process for encouraging as OFDI is likely to face high 
political risks, transaction costs and inflation when driven by particular motives such as oil 
and gas: oil and gas rich Sudan, Angola, Chad and Nigeria are easily among the high risk 
economies. Nevertheless both home and host governments can play critical roles to reduce 
such risks so as to stimulate the appropriation of more synergies once the assets of foreign 
direct investors are already in operation. 
 
Hymer (1960) had provided some of the most convincing arguments explaining the growth of 




stock of the relative benefits offered by host-sites. Lall and Streeten (1977) provided a 
detailed and incisive account of the rationale for relocation benefits and obstacles developing 
economies face from the activities of multinational corporations. Dunning (1978, 1981) 
provided arguably the most exhaustive theory to understand OFDI from home governments 
calling it the eclectic framework of ownership, location and internalization (OLI). Rugman 
and Jonathan (2008) then explained ownership advantages by differentiating country- and 
firm-specific advantages. Those elements were picked up by motives by Narula and Dunning 
(2000), Cantwell and Mudambi (2001) and Rasiah (2001).  
 
Hence, the focus here is on how home governments should respond to OFDI already in 
operation as well as those seeking to internationalize by focusing on motives. Whereas 
Dunning (1973, 1988) provided the early dissection of motives, in the following we identify 
in greater detail a range of additional motives that have driven cross border relocations (for 
discussions of investments motives see Narula and Dunning (2000), Cantwell and Mudambi 
(2001) and Rasiah (2001); for motives specifically related to investments in international 
R&D see Gammeltoft (2006)). 
 
(# promotional strategies, investment coordination, striking bargains, leveraging(#), 
sustainability) 
 
4.1 Promotional Strategies 
Governments – both central and local – in the emerging economies can coordinate better their 
promotional strategies by pooling the investors, listing them with their capabilities, and 
promoting their interests using a website as well as through their embassies abroad and trade 
ministries located in foreign countries. This strategy has worked well in Malaysia, Singapore 
and Chile. 
 
Whereas developed countries amended their customs provisions to export labor-intensive 
activities to low cost sites by lowering the value added tax on imports of the assembled and 
processed goods back (see Scibberas, 1977; Rasiah, 1988), home governments from the 
emerging markets such as Malaysia offer fiscal incentives by exempting taxes on incomes 
remitted back. This incentive on the one hand, has stimulated the relocation out of labor-
intensive stages that are no longer competitive in Malaysia thereby reducing the demand for 
imported unskilled foreign labor. On the other hand, it has encouraged firms to remit their 
profits back rather than directing them elsewhere. 
 
In addition, the Singapore government has promoted aggressively since 1989 proximate 
regions such as Johor in Malaysia and Batam in Indonesia for the relocation of its and other 
foreign enterprises with higher value added operations in Singapore. In addition to actively 
promoting their relocation the Singapore government also sought assurances from both the 
local and central governments’ favorable treatment of their businesses (MIDA, 1991; Rasiah, 
1994). 
 
4.2 Investment Coordination 
Investment coordination will be necessary to streamline incentive and grant packages offered 
to TNCs from the emerging economies by competing host-governments on the one hand and 
outlays by the TNCs on the other hand. The governments of Singapore, Malaysia, South 
Africa, India and China actively encourage their OFDI to expand their operations in certain 
markets - Southern Africa by South Africa, China and India, and Southeast Asia by Singapore, 
the entire South economies by Malaysia, and where strong reserves of oil and natural gas is 




explicit policy to promote OFDI and has negotiated investment guarantees with 64 countries 
(Zainal, 2005; see also UNCTAD, 2006, p. 216).  
 
Whereas official policy evolved to promote OFDI from countries such as Singapore and 
Malaysia, in some countries restrictions on OFDI were gradually removed. In South Africa – 
which accounts for the highest OFDI from Africa – restrictions were imposed to invest only 
in Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland before 1996 (UNCTAD, 2006, p. 207). Investment 
ceilings were established from 1997 until 2004 when they were completely abolished. The 
Korean government only allowed OFDI to secure raw material supplies and to facilitate 
exports until 1968 when OFDI was permitted. However, severe restrictions were maintained 
to prevent capital flight. The liberalization of OFDI increased from 1981 as Korean firms 
began to expand into global markets (UNCTAD, 2008, p. 208). 
 
Investment coordination is also necessary to reduce undue and sometimes xenophobic 
responses by host-governments and pressure groups. Takeovers of firms in the developed 
economies by TNCs from the emerging economies have has raised questions related to 
national security, fair practice and the risk of “losing technology to foreign rivals”. The 
Chinese State owned CNOOC’s attempted takeover of the American owned Unocal in 2005 
was blocked after strong political opposition. Lenovo from Beijing acquired IBM’s personal 
computer division in 2005 triggering strong investigation in the United States before the deal 
was actually approved (UNCTAD, 2006, p. 242). Mittal Steel’s merger with Arcelor in 2005 
met with stiff opposition before the deal went through (UNCTAD, 2006, p. 245). The 
governments of France and India were strongly involved in the background in this deal. # 
Other examples are… 
 
It will help for governments to collaborate especially when dealing with South-South 
investment flows. Exchange rate fluctuations and government restrictions on the currency 
flows can have a bearing on OFDI flows. Areas of collaboration can include the installation 
of preventive financial instruments to restrict capital flights involving large share investments 
into host-country enterprises (see Yilmaz, 1997; Stiglitz, 1998;  Rasiah, 2000. Chile has in 
place a tax on capital exiting within one year of entry (Agosin, 1998). Malaysia introduced 
capital controls in 1998 to coordinate a Keynesian-style recovery from the Asian financial 
crisis (see Rasiah, 2000). Hence, stronger collaboration among and between home and host 
countries will help reduce the risks associated with capital flows and other provide better 
information flow. 
 
Within the South Commission and the auspices of UNCTAD and UNIDO, efforts were made 
to establish stronger collaboration between members of the South to avert the disastrous 
impact of market power that arises from asymmetric power relations. Existing frameworks for 
investment coordination still continue to generate little consensus because of concerns caused 
by asymmetric power structure between OFDI and the recipient economies. The rapid 
expansion of OFDI from the emerging economies can offer a different perspective towards 
coordinating foreign investment flows from emerging economies if coordinated through the 
aegis of the South Centre (formerly the South Commission).  
 
Bilateral government to government investment coordination a la the old format used by the 
developed economies still dominates the execution of investment deals from the emerging 
economies. The asymmetric power structure in government to government negotiations on 
investment coordination has been a major reason why critics consider such bilateral deals as 
unfairly benefiting the richer economies.  
 
However, given the problems of information it will help for governments to broaden 
cooperation among and between home and host governments so that OFDI flows can be 




their relational links established under the South framework to facilitate further investment 
flows.  
 
4.3 Striking Bargains 
Whereas endowments – both inherited and created – have been the key driver of TNC 
redeployment patterns, home and host governments have often played an important role in 
promoting and coordinating the relocation process. Most of the bargains have involved TNCs 
and host governments. The Warren-Murray debate on TNC-governments bargaining is among 
the earliest arguments about the pattern of relocation and benefits developing economies 
could enjoy. Warren (1975; 1980) made the point that states are in a better position to 
condition TNCs activities to meet their ends as the rivalry between TNCs has become more 
intense. Murray (1975) took the opposite position that states are in a weaker position owing to 
the underdeveloped and uncoordinated nature of relations between them when compared to 
relations between TNCs. This debate emphasized the dynamic nature of the two formations, 
i.e. TNCs and states. The former is a less complex firm organization – spread across borders 
and more easily managed than the latter, which is characterized by a complex set of 
relationships, mechanisms and conduct. Relations between and among them are not 
monolithic. Rivalry between TNCs often strengthens the position of government. The 
converse can also happen as rivalry between states raises the bargaining power of TNCs.  
 
Under circumstances of multilateral cooperation, the capacity of individual governments to 
leverage effectively to extract maximum gains from TNCs will be high. However, conditions 
and the asymmetries between TNCs (e.g. market shares, technological capabilities and source 
of national support) and governments (e.g. social conditions, labor market conditions, 
infrastructure (basic and high tech), and political stability) differ and it is extremely difficult 
to predict TNC-government relations. However, TNCs enjoy greater autonomy and hence 
have greater control over their conduct because of domestic pressures government face from 
the different constituencies that they represent. Moreover, TNCs often enjoy support from 
their own national governments. Apart from companies seeking equity investment 
aggressively, ordinary shareholders generally do not shape the activities of TNCs. The chief 
executive and top management themselves often hold significant number of shares – aimed at 
resolving principal-agent problems - and hence effectively control the operations of most 
TNCs. Hence, TNCs rather than governments enjoy greater autonomy. 
 
Information asymmetry, variances in technological and market strength of firms, and 
endowments enjoyed by economies, and the greater complexity of relationships that define 
the conduct of governments make bargains and outcomes difficult to predict. Nevertheless, an 
understanding of the circumstances under which TNCs and governments bargain, and the 
specific objective sought by them – e.g. relocation or industrial upgrading involving existing 




Home governments from the emerging economies have strengthened their bid to invest 
abroad by pooling and organizing carefully the range of benefits that OFDI participants can 
provide at host-sites. Some home governments such as Singapore and Malaysia display 
leveraging strategies to harness better returns. These initiatives are largely handled by 
individual home governments seeking to maximize benefits for OFDI from host economies. 
Capitalization, governance capabilities and the record of having operated export-processing 





Home governments have also been directly involved in the formation of companies that have 
sought land leaseholds from host-governments to promote export-processing activities. For 
example, Temasik Holdings acquired leasehold rights to the EPZ in Batam (Indonesia) and 
the high tech park in Cyberabad (India) packaging its excellent record in attracting FDI with 
actual promotion of these locations to attract foreign direct investment. With the active 
encouragement of the Malaysian government, Maascorp was formed in 1992 to promote 
South-South investment and trade. Among the investments it has made include the acquisition 
of leasehold rights to an EPZ in Danang. # E.g. Singapore industrial park in China 
 
It will certainly help home governments organizing foreign EPZs to understand the motives 
behind why particular firms are seeking relocation abroad as one key role they play has been 
on attracting OFDI. It will be unlikely for such TNCs to attract large retail outlets into EPZs 
as these areas are often cut off from the principal customs areas from where the normal 
residents live. This will also apply for firms seeking natural resources, which is determined by 
the location of the minerals. TNCs relocating abroad to seek labor, technology, incentives and 
control over value chains are the most widely sought for relocation at EPZs. 
 
4.5 Sustainability 
TNCs have long included corporate social responsibility (CSR) as an integral part of their 
activities at host-sites following the adoption of codes of conduct by the United Nations 
Centre for Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) which has since been absorbed under 
UNCTAD and pressure groups in both home and host countries (see Jenkins, 2001; Rock, 
Murphy, Rasiah, Seters and Managi, 2008). Much of these activities appear to have emerged 
essentially to solve problems caused by TNCs. Since the emergence of global warming, 
governments, pressure groups and firms in the developed economies have increasingly 
encouraged the introduction of CSR practices in firms investing in the developing economies. 
These practices have varied owing to the different motives TNCs have placed when seeking 
relocation. 
 
Whereas home governments can help coordinate better CSR activities, it will also help allay 
fears of negative consequences for host governments and other stakeholders of takeovers. 
Host institutions often dislike takeovers of large public utilities and parastatals because of its 
potential impact on retrenchments and over the issue of losing control of strategic and 
important assets to foreigners. In some cases non-governmental organizations see kickbacks 
involved in the takeovers so that the objective of providing a service to take account of public 
utility characteristics is compromised for profits. Attempts have been made by the members 
of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) process to include trade unions and other worker 
representatives in investment deals but trade unions have complained that their role have been 
reduced to passive participation. For example the attempt by Mittal Steel to takeover 40 
percent equity in Krakatau Steel in 2008 brought huge demonstrations from the unions in 
Indonesia. Similarly civil society members in Andhra Pradesh protested in 2006 over the 
privileges (that included differential water rates favoring companies over the residents) given 
to the high tech firms locating in Cyberabad, which is leased to Singapore state owned 
Temasik Holdings.  
 
Because TNCs from a  number of the emerging economies carry with them the South tag 
efforts should be taken to address the genuine concerns of power squeeze by TNCs so that a 
more acceptable agreements can be established between these countries. Interviews with 
primary industry and planning officials of Sudan, South Africa, Indonesia, Namibia and 
Cambodia suggest that the conduct of TNCs from China and India in Africa may have 
improved to honor national considerations such as the hiring and training of local employees.2  
                                                 






A deeper probe into the features of outward foreign direct investment from emerging 
economics (OFDI) reveals recent shifts in investment motives, ownership modes, sectoral 
composition and typical destinations; shifts sufficiently large to warrant the proposition of a 
new and qualitatively different ‘third wave’ of OFDI, different from the two previous waves 
depicted in the received literature. We outlined the features of such a wave. 
 
The paper further examined the strategic drivers of OFDI. Understanding better the 
underlying drivers can assist home governments to construct more effective policies and 
coordinate better existing operations of their national firms abroad. It is obvious that much of 
the theorization of the leading path creators such as Dunning (1981) remain important in 
explaining OFDI from the emerging economies, which holds even where the FDI from the 
emerging economies is targeted to the developed economies. 
 
Although UNCTAD (2006) reports from a 2005 survey that markets and natural resources 
were the prime drivers of OFDI, the evidence here suggests that all the key drivers of OFDI 
are important, viz., markets, natural resources, labor, technology, financial incentives and 
control of value chains. Besides, because the specificity of each of the drivers is critical home 
governments need to pay attention to the motives and activities of their own TNCs rather than 
simply the aggregate picture provided by global surveys.  
 
The surge in OFDI from the emerging economies has given a new dimension to the 
arguments on regulation. Contrary to the official government prescriptions– i.e. to liberalize 
investment governance structures - many home governments have acted to regulate strongly 
OFDI from the emerging economies. Although narrow national interests have often driven 
decision making it is important for home governments to consider the broader interest of 
promoting capital flows to ensure the long term development of economies. 
 
Given the growing significance of OFDI from the emerging economies it will help if the 
home and host governments involved seek to establish common and specific collaboration 
platforms to raise information flows as well as coordinate better the negotiations and 
execution of investment projects. Being members of the South group and as latecomers 
having viewed the experience of OFDI flows from developed economies both home and host 
governments could discuss these issues with less asymmetric problems. A common but loose 
multilateral investment framework among these economies (but with room for flexibility) 
could be better achieved among the South economies than the previously failed efforts at the 
global front. While investor interest will remain the key driver, any common agreement 
should incorporate elements of corporate social responsibility and national interests. Instead 
of reinventing the wheel the codes of conduct adopted originally by the United Nations 
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